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Tuesday, 10 November 2009 20:18

Predicting the imminent death of atheistic Communism, Karol Wojtyla, prior to becoming Pope, specified that the end would occur not during an armed conflict on a traditional battlefield, but principally because of the failure of Communism to appreciate the dignity of man. He was, of course, correct. Communism imploded in 1989 because it could not even match Christianity’s dynamic and perennial doctrine that each and every human being is unique, precious and unrepeatable.

Communism’s politically inept position, reflecting Karl Marx’s assessment, was outlined for the modern world by the German philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach (d. 1872). Marx’s celebrated Eleven Theses on Feuerbach postulated the principle of priority of changing reality over its purely speculative interpretation.

Pope John Paul II is credited as being one of the first world-class thinkers who fully realized the disastrous consequences of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. And one of these consequences, recently being embraced by many who profess so-called atheistic humanism or secularism is that the human being’s worth must be calibrated against measurements alien to spiritual realities.

In blunt language, human beings are not meant to be assessed chiefly in terms of their materialistic productivity to society, whether in terms of financial gain, political prowess, special academic accomplishment, media control, sheer power, or popularity. Christianity maintains that the value of a person is really measured in terms of who he or she is before God, and not in terms of his or her possessions or talents. Pope John Paul the Great expressed this truth many, many times, by stressing "the primacy of man over things." Pope Benedict XVI has also repeatedly stated the same.

The traditional vision of man is, in the eyes of the Church, radically different from that of the world. The difference is dramatically evident in areas touching the end of life, as well as the beginning. Exponents of secularism as well as atheistic humanism (which is really an absurd concept) currently embrace the notion of "quality of life" as the highest criterion in so-called "terminal cases." Health care personnel refer to it regularly, and many confused bioethicists hide behind it as an excuse for an inability (or, at times, refusal) to concentrate on the primary ethical dimensions of their professions.

"Quality of life" is clearly one aspect of a seriously ill or infirm person’s end-of-life treatment and care. But it certainly is not the principal aspect, at least if strictly ethical concerns are acknowledged. The principal aspect is the sanctity of every human life; hence, judgments about treatment or care must be made as to whether procedures – opted for – are disproportionate: overly risky, too burdensome, or simply useless. "Quality of life," on the other hand, is too often interpreted as signifying that a patient is of diminished worth in the eyes of society (or its agents) and hence "less deserving" than others of the service that medicine can offer.

Evidently the very phrase, "quality of life," entered the medical vocabulary in opposition to the Church’s "sanctity of life" criterion. In a sense, it enables overt discrimination by contradicting the religious principle that all human beings are equal in dignity, and possessed of independent value, from the moment of conception.

Besides, a "quality of life" standard that is primary allows the arbitrary imposition of life and death decisions upon those who, reduced to helplessness, have no veto power over such an imposition.

Of course, none of the above arguments as to each person’s worth can be reasonably defended unless ethics is properly grasped. Moreover, the anchor of all ethical action is God. As the God-intoxicated Russian novelist and philosopher, Fyodor Dostoevsky insisted, man is measured in God’s light, and if there is no God, anything is permitted.